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Not since the Great Depression has so much of the world faced
widespread banking problems, with 112 episodes of systemic banking
crises in 93 countries since the late 1970s (Caprio and Klingebiel 1999).
These crises have imposed signiﬁcant economic and ﬁscal costs on the
countries involved; Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) ﬁnd the average
direct costs of banking collapses to be equal to 12.8 percent of GDP, with
many countries’ direct costs substantially exceeding this percentage.
Problems in the banking sector extend well beyond the ﬁscal cost to
taxpayers, for a number of reasons. First, many ﬁrms do not have
signiﬁcant access to nonbank sources of external ﬁnance. Second, most
ﬁrms have relied on ﬁnancing from domestic banks, with bank relation-
ships being highly valued and frequently including cross-shareholding or
inclusion of bank representatives on the ﬁrm’s board of directors. Third,
most domestic banks in a given country have had similar portfolio
exposures, so that banking problems have tended to affect the entire
banking sector, rather than being idiosyncratic and affecting only a few
individual banks. Thus, a major domestic shock can impair the solvency
of a country’s entire banking industry, leaving a country with no (or few)
healthy major banks.
Such a sharp deterioration in the health of a country’s banking sector
forces the government to make a stark choice. On the one hand, bank
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System.regulators can undertake strict enforcement of bank regulations that will
result in the widespread closure of insolvent banks. This can ensure the
safety and soundness of the banks that do survive, but bank closures can
be quite expensive for taxpayers, and the cost of the ensuing credit crunch
can be substantial for individual ﬁrms and for the overall performance of
the macroeconomy. While the early closure of insolvent banks can stop
the ﬂow of red ink and contain the cost to the government of recapital-
izing the banking system, at least in the short run, the increased
macroeconomic costs associated with lost GDP have the potential to more
than offset any cost savings, as weakened and failed ﬁrms cut production
and employment. This path becomes even more problematic for policy-
makers if it leads to destabilization of the economy and political unrest.
The alternative for bank regulators is to follow a policy of forbearance,
allowing insolvent banks (and ﬁrms) to continue operating. Such a policy
may limit the severity of any credit crunch, but it may also increase the
ultimate cost to the government of recapitalizing the banking system.
This will be particularly true if the moral hazard problem leads insolvent
banks to take risky bets in a gamble for resurrection.
Bank regulators in many countries in Asia and Latin America have
been focused on triage for their banking sector, and many banking
reforms have, by necessity, been a pragmatic reaction to evolving
domestic economic problems. Some countries have initiated major re-
forms, such as enhanced disclosure in ﬁnancial statements, measures to
improve transparency, and enhanced regulatory oversight. However, the
sequence of measures taken has frequently had a pattern of two steps
forward and one step back, as bank regulators have sometimes retreated
from their initial supervisory and regulatory reforms in an attempt to
satisfy political constraints and placate a populace resentful of squan-
dered funds and the huge potential tax liabilities caused by banking
problems.
In response to the difﬁculties associated with reforming domestic
bank supervision during a banking crisis, a number of countries have, in
effect, imported their bank supervision by encouraging greater penetra-
tion of domestic markets by foreign banks. While foreign banks are
subject to supervision by the host country, they also are supervised by
their home country supervisor, which frequently provides more over-
sight and requires greater disclosure than traditionally has been the case
in many emerging markets.
A decision to open up domestic banking markets to foreign compe-
tition can provide important potential beneﬁts for the host country, but it
is not without signiﬁcant risks. Among the beneﬁts of opening domestic
markets to foreign bank entry are the importation of new management
and information technologies to improve banking services, the provision
of a new source of funds to recapitalize a troubled banking sector, the
provision of an alternative “safe haven” within the country that can
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crisis, and the presence of deep-pocket, well-capitalized (foreign) banks
that can continue lending following a major adverse shock that substan-
tially weakens the domestic banking sector. Arguments against allowing
the entry of foreign banks into domestic markets usually include concerns
that the competition from foreign ﬁrms will weaken domestic banks, that
local regulatory and monetary authorities will have a diminished ability
to alter bank behavior, that adverse shocks to foreign banks that are
external to the host country may be destabilizing insofar as they ad-
versely affect the banks’ behavior in the host country, and that foreign
banks will not serve as a stabilizing inﬂuence by providing additional
credit during a crisis in the host country.
Of course, many ﬁrms still have access to credit from foreign banks,
even if those banks do not have a local presence. Much cross-border
lending occurs through ofﬁces in a bank’s home country (or even one of
its subsidiaries located in a third country), with no subsidiary (or even
branch presence) located in the country in which the borrowing ﬁrm is
headquartered. While retail banking requires brick and mortar points of
contact with customers, wholesale banking requires a much smaller
investment. For example, banks with no physical presence in a country
can lend substantial volumes of funds to ﬁrms and governmental entities
of that country through project ﬁnance and loan participations. However,
the composition of borrowers will differ, depending on whether a foreign
bank has a physical presence in a country or makes all of its loans from
offshore. For example, offshore lending would tend to beneﬁt multina-
tional ﬁrms and the larger, more well-established ﬁrms in a country. On
the other hand, a local retail-banking network would rely in part on
funding from local depositors and also typically make credit available to
small and mid-sized ﬁrms, as well as individual consumers. Thus, the
distribution of the potential beneﬁts across economic agents in a country
that can arise from the provision of intermediary services by foreign
banks will differ, depending on whether the banks have a physical
presence in that country and on the nature of their operations.
A key question that has important implications for the extent and
nature of any beneﬁts or costs of foreign bank activity is how foreign
banks behave during a banking crisis. Will foreign banks ﬁll the void left
by weakened domestic banks whose lending capacity is reduced by a
large domestic shock, or will foreign banks retreat in the face of emerging
problems in the host economy? Will strong foreign banks with a local
presence serve as a safe haven for domestic depositors that is a viable
alternative to moving their deposits offshore? In that case, a ﬂight to
quality by depositors associated with a crisis (or the threat of a crisis) will
not produce as severe a drain of funds from the country’s banking
system. Furthermore, if foreign banks do expand market share, how do
they choose to expand? Do they increase offshore lending from ofﬁces in
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located in the host country, or make acquisitions of existing banks in the
host country?
This paper focuses on the Latin American experience with foreign
bank penetration, the response of foreign banks during a crisis, and the
implications for bank supervision of having globally active banks with
signiﬁcant stakes in the domestic banking sector of emerging economies.
Focusing on Latin America has several advantages. First, individual Latin
American countries have adopted different strategies toward foreign
banks. Argentina has become particularly open to foreign banks and
Mexico is beginning to be more open, while countries such as Brazil and
Ecuador have been somewhat reluctant to open their banking markets.
Second, the series of shocks that buffeted Latin America during the 1990s
provides an opportunity to examine how foreign banks respond to both
banking and currency crises that potentially have signiﬁcant effects on the
domestic economy.
We ﬁrst examine different measures of foreign bank penetration. We
ﬁnd that common measures of foreign bank penetration used in many
previous studies substantially understate penetration, because they ig-
nore offshore lending, or they may overstate the increases in penetration,
because they focus only on the growth of foreign subsidiaries. We also
ﬁnd that calculating foreign bank penetration using only Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) cross-border claims data will understate
foreign bank activity in some countries, since foreign subsidiaries from
BIS-nonreporting countries have been increasing. Furthermore, we ﬁnd
that foreign bank penetration does not always tend to decrease after a
crisis. For many of the countries studied, all measures of foreign bank
penetration rose after crises, with some instances reﬂecting acquisitions
by foreign banks and others reﬂecting internal growth of lending by
existing foreign bank operations relative to their domestic competitors.
The rise in bank penetration has primarily been the result of expanded
lending by foreign subsidiaries, with some evidence that offshore lending
does decrease after a crisis. This implies that host countries interested in
longer-term lending relationships may prefer to have the brick and
mortar investment of foreign bank subsidiaries rather than the offshore
lending that tends to ﬂee during a crisis.
The ﬁrst section of the paper elaborates on the costs and beneﬁts of
opening the domestic banking sector to foreign competition and brieﬂy
provides some background on the legal and economic conditions that
have affected foreign bank penetration in three major Latin American
countries. The second section describes the data, a combination from a
variety of international banking sources. The third section describes how
foreign banks have reacted to recent crises affecting Latin American
countries. The fourth section draws out international supervisory impli-
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vides some conclusions.
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FOREIGN BANK COMPETITION
Opening the banking sector to foreign entry has been a highly
sensitive issue. Many East Asian countries have allowed only isolated
acquisitions of domestic banks by foreign banks. While several countries
in Latin America have encouraged foreign bank entry, it remains a
sensitive issue in some of the biggest markets. This has been particularly
true in Brazil, where the proposed sale of Banespa (Banco do Estado de
Sao Paolo), a large government-owned bank with an extensive branch
network, has resulted in much criticism. Furthermore, the Brazilian
government has announced that foreign banks would not be allowed to
open new branches or acquire smaller banks unless they purchased one
of the troubled government-owned banks. However, the willingness of
the Brazilian government to continue to open its banking markets despite
political opposition reﬂects its recognition of the signiﬁcant potential
beneﬁts of an increased foreign bank presence.
A more open banking market that allows well-capitalized, interna-
tionally diversiﬁed banks to enter has several substantial potential
beneﬁts. First, such ﬁrms are likely to be able to provide bank ﬁnancing
to creditworthy borrowers, even in the presence or aftermath of a
signiﬁcant, adverse domestic shock. While local banks with only (or
primarily) domestic operations may be severely impaired by domestic
shocks, a large global bank with operations in many countries (and with
the host country representing a small share of its exposure) is much less
likely to be affected. This is particularly true because the impacts of recent
international shocks have been localized. The recent problems in both
East Asia and Latin America did little to dampen the European and
American economies, enabling banks headquartered in those countries to
be well positioned should good lending opportunities arise.
Second, global banks are often an important source of new capital for
a devastated banking sector following a crisis. Foreign banks have been
a major source of funding in the aftermath of the banking crises in
Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, and these crises have been one of the
major catalysts for allowing foreign bank entry. A severe banking crisis
rarely leaves domestic banks well capitalized, and recapitalizing banks
with private sector funding frequently requires ﬁnding investors who
have not been heavily exposed to the domestic shock. Allowing foreign
banks to enter a previously closed market or substantially increasing the
foreign bank presence in the market can provide additional sources of
private sector funding for bank recapitalization plans, thus reducing the
costs to the government relative to the costs incurred if only domestic
investors can bid for the good assets of failed banks. In addition, the
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ﬁrms to consider investing in the host country, in much the same way
that banks have been shown to follow their customers abroad (Seth and
Nolle 1996).
Third, global banks bring to the host country practices consistent
with the ﬁnancial and regulatory reporting requirements of their home
country. For example, for U.S. banks, Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) requirements for reporting material events and even stock
exchange listing requirements frequently provide signiﬁcant improve-
ments in disclosure compared to those in an emerging market host
country. Similarly, the reporting of host country activities to the home
country regulator often requires information systems and details that
may not be standard in the host country. These improvements in ﬁnancial
reporting are likely to have positive spillover effects, as personnel switch
to domestic competitors and as regulators, investors, and depositors
become aware of differences between the operations of domestic and
foreign banks.
Fourth, many of the globally active banks are among the most
efﬁcient in their home country, and they are likely to introduce improved
management and information technologies to the host banking market
(Focarelli and Pozzolo 2000). Entry of foreign banks is one way to quickly
transfer the best practices currently in use in more developed banking
markets (Levine 1996), thus improving the efﬁciency and range of
intermediation services in the host country.
Finally, the presence of well-capitalized foreign banks may lessen the
severity of domestic shocks by mitigating the extent to which the funds of
worried domestic savers and investors ﬂee the country when an adverse
shock is anticipated. Foreign banks frequently provide a safe haven for
depositors who might otherwise choose to remove their funds from the
country rather than risk leaving funds in a failing domestic bank. Such a
ﬂight to quality would cause further pressures on foreign exchange rates
and liquidity, draining the country of hard currency at the time it is most
needed. In addition, in countries that allow foreign currency deposits,
depositors may be more comfortable placing such deposits in foreign
banks that have more ready access to foreign currency during a banking
crisis, with the lender of last resort for the bank being the central bank in
the bank’s home country rather than that of the host country.
Despite the many advantages to allowing foreign banks to enter
domestic banking markets, signiﬁcant resistance remains. Even with the
severe ﬁnancial problems of many domestic banks in East Asia, the extent
of sales of troubled banks to foreigners has remained relatively limited.
And notwithstanding several large bank failures and nationalizations of
banks in Japan, Long-Term Credit Bank, to date, is the only major
Japanese bank to be sold to non-Japanese investors. Instead, the govern-
ment has preferred to sell troubled banks to other troubled banks (such as
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Tokashuko) or to commercial ﬁrms (Softbank, an internet software
company, has been chosen as the acquirer of Nippon Credit Bank), or to
have mergers among domestic banks. Similar resistance to accepting
foreign direct investment in their domestic banking market has been the
case in other Asian countries.
Perhaps most often voiced is the concern that foreign banks will not
have an attachment to domestic borrowers. Obviously, a multinational
bank faced with a binding capital constraint can choose where to shrink
assets, and evidence from the Japanese banking crisis indicates that banks
do sometimes choose to shrink their host country operations more than
those at home when they have home country problems (Peek and
Rosengren 1997; 2000). However, recent case studies have indicated that
multinational banks will expand operations when faced with host coun-
try problems (Goldberg, Dages, and Kinney 2000). Of course, if the home
and host country problems are correlated, domestic borrowers may be
forced to seek alternatives at a time when they are least available, to the
extent that multinational banks have a weaker attachment to the borrow-
ers in the host country compared to those in their home country.
A second concern is that regulatory and monetary authorities may
have less control if the banking sector has a sizable foreign bank presence.
In many countries, the banking system is an instrument for government
credit allocation schemes, with lending directed to sectors viewed as key
by the government. This can be done directly, through government-
controlled lending agencies or mandates to domestic banks, or indirectly,
by encouraging lending to preferred sectors through the tax code or
subsidies, such as low-cost loans from the central bank. Furthermore, the
regulator’s ability to engage in moral suasion may be lessened when
dealing with an entity more focused on the expected ﬁnancial returns
from a transaction and less sensitive to domestic goals promulgated by
the government.
The third concern is that bank supervisors could lose control of
decisions that may have an impact on the economy. Foreign banks may
be more responsive to changes in capital requirements or disclosure
requirements of the home country regulator, whose regulations may be
the binding constraint on their behavior, and such changes have the
potential to adversely affect the willingness of these foreign banks to lend
in the host country. Furthermore, decisions to acquire or merge with
other banks or to become involved in nontraditional banking activities
that may indirectly affect the willingness of the foreign bank to lend in the
host country may be strongly affected by the home country regulator.
The fourth concern is that the domestically owned banks may be
unable to compete globally, having operated with a lack of up-to-date
technology and services and in a protected environment that did not
penalize inefﬁciency. Then, entry by efﬁcient, globally competitive ﬁrms
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE BANKING SECTOR 151may cause further ﬁnancial distress in a sector that is often already deeply
troubled and may contribute to a further weakening and additional
failures of domestically owned banks. In fact, several studies have found
that foreign entry results in lower interest margins and a reduction in
proﬁtability of domestic banks (Clarke, Cull, D’Amato, and Molinari
1999; Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga 1998). Furthermore, mul-
tinational banks may draw the most creditworthy borrowers that desire
greater access to knowledge and services for international operations,
leaving only the riskiest ﬁrms as loan customers for the domestically
owned banks.
The ﬁnal concern is political rather than economic. Fears that foreign
banks will not be responsive to domestic credit needs often fuel populist
reactions. In addition, the point is sometimes raised that local deposits
will be used to fund projects outside the host country. Thus, relaxation of
restrictions on foreign bank entry has tended to occur most often as a
consequence of adverse shocks that cause a severe deterioration in the
health of domestic banks or as the result of a move to privatize publicly
owned banks.
Brazil
Brazil’s banking market is the largest in Latin America, and it has
undergone substantial changes over the past decade. Prior to 1994, Brazil
had a relatively small foreign subsidiary presence, with the number of
foreign banks frozen at its 1988 level, although foreign banks were subject
to the same regulations as Brazilian-owned banks. Problems in the
macroeconomy associated with hyperinﬂation diminished the ability of
the Brazilian banking sector to provide standard intermediation services
and made the banking market less attractive for aggressive foreign entry.
Domestic banks, faced with challenging domestic economic conditions,
specialized in managing the ﬂoat, which enabled them to proﬁt despite
rapid inﬂation.
With the adoption of the Real plan in 1994, the Brazilian government
committed to returning to a low-inﬂation environment. This commitment
implied signiﬁcant changes in the economic environment for banks, as
they were now expected to be proﬁtable from extending credit, and both
banks and ﬁrms could no longer expect to generate proﬁts through
managing the inﬂation ﬂoat. The restructuring of the economy and the
banking system resulted in many banks having negative net worth. In
response, the government adopted deposit insurance, creating the Credit
Guaranty Fund, and added a program of incentives for the restructuring
and strengthening of the ﬁnancial system, as well as a program of
incentives for the reduction of the role of the state public sector in
banking activities. Foreign bank entry was approved on a case-by-case
basis, to recapitalize troubled banks or to encourage development in
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more supervisory powers and enhanced its ability to close and sell
troubled banks.
The combination of government interest in selling off troubled
banking assets and a macroeconomic environment more conducive to
banking services normally provided by foreign banks resulted in a
signiﬁcant increase in foreign bank penetration. Foreign banks increased
their share of the net worth of the banking system from 7.3 percent in
1993 to 15.8 percent in 1998 (Banco Central do Brasil 1998).
Brazil is continuing the process of privatizing government-controlled
banks. One of the largest state banks, Banespa, is particularly attractive
because of its large retail operations, and the government is currently
soliciting bids, which could possibly attract several foreign bidders. The
rising foreign bank presence in Brazil and the continued sale of state-
controlled banks has also increased political discussion concerning the
optimal level of foreign bank penetration.
Mexico
In the wake of the 1982 debt crisis, Mexico nationalized all banks
except one foreign bank, Citibank, and one union-owned bank, Obrero.
The banks remained under government control until Mexico decided to
privatize the state-owned banks, a process that was completed in 1992.
The privatization program limited foreign participation to a 30 percent
stake, with a 5 percent cap on individual foreign bidders. Beginning in
1994, new bank regulations and the adoption of NAFTA allowed new
entry by foreign banks. They began to establish subsidiaries in Mexico,
with much of their focus on wholesale rather than retail banking.
Following the Tequila crisis of 1994 and the failure of many of the
previously privatized domestic banks, the Mexican government further
relaxed restrictions on foreign acquisitions, in order to help recapitalize
domestic banks that had encountered ﬁnancial difﬁculties. Starting in
1995, foreign banks were allowed to hold a controlling stake in domestic
banks, as long as the bank accounted for less than 6 percent of the
domestic banking system. For the largest banks, Grupo Fianciero Ban-
comer, Grupo Financiero Banamex, and Grupo Financiero Serﬁn, foreign
ownership was capped at 20 percent. In 1999, the restrictions on foreign
ownership of the largest banks were eliminated, allowing even the largest
banks to be foreign controlled.
The gradual relaxation of restrictions on foreign bank entry into
Mexico has resulted in foreign bank stakes increasing from less than 1
percent of loans in 1994 to 15 percent in 1998. However, the three largest
banks control roughly 60 percent of the Mexican banking market, and any
substantial change in foreign penetration would require ownership
changes among the three. And indeed, current changes may dramatically
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Banamex, made an unsolicited offer for Grupo Financiero Bancomer after
the latter had agreed to be acquired by a Spanish bank, BBVA, although
BBVA did win the bidding. The third largest bank, Grupo Financiero
Serﬁn, required government intervention and was sold to Banco San-
tander, a Spanish bank, which outbid the other major bidder, HSBC, a
British bank. While the situation remains ﬂuid, by the end of 2000, foreign
banks will account for a substantial share of the Mexican market.
Argentina
As in Brazil, the banking system in Argentina was signiﬁcantly
altered by the country’s macroeconomic policies of the late 1980s, which
culminated in several years of hyperinﬂation. The combination of hyper-
inﬂation and a freezing of bank deposits resulted in a dramatic shrinking
of inside money, so that the ratio of M3 to GDP was only 5 percent as of
1990 (Calomiris and Powell 2000). In 1991, the Argentine government
adopted a currency board, as well as a series of bank reform measures.
The existence of a currency board prevented the central bank of Argen-
tina from lending money to governmental or ﬁnancial institutions, but
the reforms gave the central bank considerable independent authority to
supervise and regulate ﬁnancial institutions. The foreign bank presence
in Argentina at the time was relatively small, with roughly 15 percent of
the ﬁnancial institutions being foreign owned, a reﬂection of the turbu-
lent macroeconomic environment.
Foreign bank penetration was inﬂuenced by three events, the invest-
ment law, the Tequila crisis, and the ongoing privatization program. First,
the investment law required that foreign capital be treated the same as
domestic capital. This encouraged foreign direct investment into Argen-
tina, including investments into the private sector. Second, the Tequila
crisis substantially weakened a number of Argentine banks, with 12
banks liquidated, 39 merged, and two suspended and eventually merged
(Calomiris and Powell 2000). The Tequila crisis also resulted in a
substantial outﬂow of bank deposits, with a 17 percent decline after
December 1994 (Moody’s 1995). The serious ﬁnancial stress on the
banking system caused the central bank to lower reserve requirements
and the government to introduce deposit insurance. The bank privatiza-
tion program was accelerated. While only three institutions were privat-
ized between 1992 and 1994, 15 institutions with assets of over 4 trillion
pesos were privatized between 1995 and 1999. While privatized banks
mostly attracted domestic capital, privatization also provided greater
entry points for foreign banks to purchase existing banks and, by 1999,
foreign banks accounted for approximately 40 percent of all deposits.
Argentina has been a market leader in adopting open banking
markets with substantial regulatory oversight. Foreign bank penetration
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Latin American countries. In addition to encouraging foreign investment
in the banking system, the central bank has adopted a number of
supervisory innovations. Banks are required to hold minimum risk-based
capital of 11.5 percent, well above the minimum BIS standards. In
addition, capital requirements are adjusted according to a bank’s CAMEL
rating issued by bank supervisors; banks are required to provide regular
ﬁnancial reports according to standards that are similar to U.S. Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles; banks are required to issue subordi-
nated debt, and banks are required to obtain regular credit ratings from
authorized rating agencies. Thus, while the existence of a currency board
has prevented Argentina’s central bank from assuming the traditional
lender of last resort role, providing less ﬂexibility in addressing ﬁnancial
crises, it has encouraged the central bank to be more innovative in
preventing future banking crises, including allowing for more signiﬁcant
foreign bank penetration than has occurred in most other Latin American
countries.
FOREIGN LENDING TO ARGENTINA,M EXICO, AND BRAZIL
Because of the recent ﬁnancial history in many of the countries,
consistent time series for Latin American bank data over an extended
period of time are impossible to develop. Mexican banks were not
privatized until the early 1990s, and Argentine and Brazilian banks
and banking data are so different during the hyperinﬂation period that
the data prior to the adoption of the Real plan in Brazil and the
currency convertibility in Argentina are not comparable to those for
more recent periods. Thus, our sample for all three countries begins in
1994.
Because of the large offshore lending operations to many Latin
American countries, it is important to focus on total cross-border com-
mercial bank credit provided to a country, rather than limiting the
analysis to commercial bank credit provided by domestically owned
banks and domestic subsidiaries of foreign banks located in that country.
Banks that are interested only in providing ﬁnancing to large multina-
tional ﬁrms with operations in a speciﬁc country, or even to the largest,
most creditworthy domestic ﬁrms in that country, may not ﬁnd it
necessary to open a bank subsidiary in that country, a process that would
require a substantial investment in brick and mortar and personnel, and
compliance with local regulatory requirements. Rather, the lending can
occur from ofﬁces in a bank’s home country or other offshore ofﬁces that
have already been established. Banks with clients that are primarily
multinational ﬁrms are likely to have contacts with a ﬁrm in a number of
countries, and the array of international ﬁnancial services desired by the
ﬁrm may not require a signiﬁcant in-country presence, since the banks’
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE BANKING SECTOR 155ﬁnancial experts, the ﬁnancial markets, and the funding sources will be
located outside the country in which the operations to be funded reside.
However, if a bank wants to cater to smaller ﬁrms in a country or is
interested in a retail banking operation in that country, it will be
important to maintain local points of contact with the customers, requir-
ing investment in a bank subsidiary located in the host country.
To capture ﬁnancing made from the home country rather than from
within the host country, we utilize data collected by the BIS. The BIS
provides semiannual reports on cross-border exposures of banks from 18
major industrialized countries (reporting countries).1 Banks headquar-
tered in the reporting countries are asked to provide their entire exposure
to customers in a borrowing country. This includes all cross-border
exposures of their bank ofﬁces worldwide, including local claims of
foreign afﬁliates of the bank. To avoid double-counting, the BIS data
exclude positions between different ofﬁces of the same bank, as well as
claims on other banks from the reporting countries. The claims of the
banks include items such as deposits and balances with other banks,
loans and advances to banks and nonbanks, holdings of securities, and
loan participations and syndications. The data are also disaggregated by
the maturity of the claim and by whether the borrowing entity is in the
public sector, private sector, or banking sector. However, the detailed
data by source country are conﬁdential.
The BIS data are structured to focus on foreign currency exposures.
To obtain the total foreign claims by banks on entities within a country,
regardless of the currency of the claim, the consolidated cross-border
claims in all currencies and local claims in non-local currencies must be
combined with the local currency claims of reporting afﬁliates with local
residence in the host country. Furthermore, double-counting can occur if
a foreign bank has a claim on another foreign bank that then lends to
local ﬁrms. To avoid this double-counting, the claims on banks with
head ofﬁces outside the country of residence must be subtracted from
the total cross-border claims. Figure 1 shows total foreign claims in
constant 1995 dollars (deﬂated by the wholesale price index) on
Argentina. Despite the variety of shocks that have buffeted the
Argentine economy, foreign claims on Argentina have been growing.
Total claims continued to grow after the Tequila crisis in December
1994, rose sharply during the second half of 1997 during the initial
stage of the East Asian problems, and then increased through the
January 1999 Brazilian devaluation.
1 Our data include only 16 of the 18 reporting countries. Switzerland and Luxembourg
are omitted because they provide data only on a conﬁdential basis. The BIS also has a
quarterly series, although it does not include coverage on a worldwide consolidated basis,
and an interbank series, which provides bank claims on related ofﬁces of the same
institution and those on unrelated banks.
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during the second half of 1994 leading up to the Tequila crisis, but then
rose continuously until June 1998. Following the peak, claims declined
rather abruptly, with the decline continuing through year-end 1999.
Figure 3 shows the same series for Mexico. Immediately following the
Mexican devaluation in December 1994, foreign claims measured in
dollars began to decline. Total claims began to increase in the second half
of 1996 and continued to rise strongly through the end of 1997. The series
then paused during the ﬁrst half of 1998 as the East Asian crisis continued
before resuming growth in the second half of the year. Total claims
peaked in December 1998 and then declined somewhat in 1999.
Overall, foreign claims in Argentina have continued to grow despite
the problems in its domestic economy, providing no evidence that
foreign borrowers will abandon markets when problems become
apparent. On the other hand, claims (measured in dollars) on Mexico
and Brazil show some evidence of declines following crises, although
comparisons with domestically owned banks are needed to clarify
whether the behavior of foreign banks differed from that of domesti-
cally owned banks.
FOREIGN BANK PENETRATION
In order to compute the degree of foreign bank penetration, equiv-
alent information for the domestic banking market of each country is
158 Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengrenrequired. Balance sheet and income data on individual banks located in
each of the three countries were obtained from the Fitch IBCA database.
IBCA covers domestically owned banks as well as foreign bank subsid-
iaries, but generally does not provide coverage of branches of foreign
banks. The IBCA coverage of banks has been incomplete until recently,
and semiannual data are available only for 1997, 1998, and 1999. The
banks were divided into two groups: those that are foreign-owned and
those with domestic ownership. We classify a bank as foreign-owned if
foreign ownership exceeds a 50 percent ownership stake. According to
correspondence with the BIS, the decision whether to include a bank’s
afﬁliates that are only partly owned and not located in its home country
is left up to the reporting bank. However, in most cases these foreign
subsidiaries are included in the consolidated reporting of the parent bank
only if the parent has a majority ownership stake, in which case 100
percent of the subsidiary’s claims are attributed to the reporting (parent)
bank.2 The sources for ownership stakes are the Bankers Almanac,
Salomon Smith Barney, various government sources, searches on
Bloomberg, and individual bank web sites.
IBCA data for individual banks are used to calculate aggregated
bank data series equivalent to those based on BIS data for the set of
subsidiaries of foreign banks and for the set of domestically owned banks
in each country. These aggregated measures are constructed from the
individual bank data by subtracting nonearning assets, equity invest-
ments, and ﬁxed assets from the sum of total assets and loan loss reserves.
We then calculate four measures of foreign bank penetration by combin-
ing BIS and IBCA data.
For the ﬁrst measure, we calculate total cross-border claims as total
BIS claims plus claims of nonreporting foreign subsidiaries (broad claims
measure), using the 50 percent ownership threshold to classify bank
subsidiaries as foreign-owned. The only cross-border claims that are
missing are those by banks from nonreporting countries booked by the
parent bank rather than through a subsidiary located in the host country.
This sum is divided by the sum of total BIS claims, claims of nonreporting
foreign subsidiaries, and claims of all domestically owned commercial
banks.
2 It can be difﬁcult to obtain precise foreign ownership stakes because banks often have
tiered ownership. A 50 percent ownership stake should generally provide control, but
because of the various classes of shares and the tiering of shareholding, foreign control is not
a straightforward calculation. Frequently, alternative sources indicate different foreign
ownership stakes for a given bank at a given time. Where possible, we have used
government sources or bank web sites when sources disagreed. However, this highlights
the difﬁculty in calculating penetration using a single source for foreign ownership stakes.
Note that a bank with less than 100 percent ownership of a subsidiary, but a greater than 50
percent ownership stake, includes 100 percent of the claims of the bank subsidiary in its
cross-border claims reported to the BIS.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE BANKING SECTOR 159Many of the recent studies of foreign bank penetration have focused
only on the banks that operate within a country’s borders (Clarke, Cull,
D’Amato, and Molinari 1999; Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga
1998; Goldberg, Dages, and Kinney 2000; Focarelli and Pozzolo 2000).
However, such an analysis excludes an important source of credit from
banks that are operating offshore. For many countries, the volume of
credit provided by foreign banking organizations from offshore, includ-
ing that provided through branches located in the host country, is much
larger than the credit provided through the foreign bank subsidiaries that
have been established in the host country. In fact, until the end of 1997,
for Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, cross-border claims not attributable to
foreign subsidiaries of banks located in BIS-reporting countries exceeded
the sum of claims of all their foreign subsidiaries in each of the countries.
The second measure of bank penetration (the narrow claims mea-
sure) ignores cross-border lending other than that done through foreign
subsidiaries within the country. It is calculated as claims of foreign
subsidiaries (from both BIS-reporting and nonreporting countries) di-
vided by the sum of claims of foreign subsidiaries and claims of
domestically owned commercial banks. The next two measures of bank
penetration focus on bank liabilities rather than bank assets. We use a
limited measure of deposits that includes demand deposits, savings
deposits, and time deposits (narrow deposit measure), as well as a more
expansive measure that also includes interbank deposits, open market
funding, and other short-term borrowing (broad deposit measure). For
both measures, we compute the penetration share as the ratio of deposits
in all foreign subsidiaries to the sum of deposits in foreign subsidiaries
and from domestically owned banks. Deposit penetration focuses on
foreign operations at the retail level, while measures of credit that include
offshore loans may capture the foreign penetration into wholesale bank
operations as well. Furthermore, deposit penetration may be particularly
responsive to crises, rising to the extent that host country depositors
engage in a ﬂight to quality.
Table 1 provides the four measures of foreign bank penetration for
Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil. It is clear from the table that both the
magnitude and the pattern of foreign penetration can differ greatly across
countries and over time, depending on the measure used. For Argentina,
where foreign penetration had been greater in 1994 by all measures than
for the other two countries, the variation is particularly striking. The
broad claims measure of penetration, which includes offshore loans and
claims of foreign subsidiaries not from BIS-reporting countries, was 46.3
percent in December 1994, more than twice the penetration level of the
other three bank penetration measures, which are based only on data for
banks located in the host country. However, the broad claims measure of
foreign penetration has been increasing more slowly than the other
measures of bank penetration, rising about 11 percentage points from
160 Joe Peek and Eric S. RosengrenDecember 1994 to December 1999. In contrast, the increase in the
penetration by foreign bank subsidiaries shown in the narrow claims
measure is dramatic, rising from 13.0 percent at the end of 1994 to 42.9
percent by the end of 1999. Thus, an increasing share of total foreign
claims on Argentina can be attributed to foreign bank subsidiaries located
in Argentina, rather than to offshore lending.
Bank penetration measures also vary substantially for Brazil and
Mexico. The broad claims measure of foreign bank penetration in
December 1994 was 18.0 percent for Brazil, again more than twice the
penetration calculated by the other three measures that are based only on
banks located in Brazil. For Mexico, with its more severe restrictions on
foreign ownership of banks, the broad claims measure was 31.3 percent in
December 1994, while the other three measures were no greater than 1
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Broad Claims 46.3 45.1 50.2 56.1 55.5 55.7 56.7 57.5
Narrow Claims 13.0 18.5 27.7 39.6 47.5 40.7 45.1 42.9
Broad Deposit 15.1 20.4 28.7 40.1 47.4 44.6 45.3 46.9




















Broad Claims 18.0 21.0 23.5 29.8 32.3 31.6 36.1 36.1
Narrow Claims 6.5 6.4 11.0 19.1 21.5 21.4 23.2 25.2
Broad Deposit 6.1 5.8 10.1 16.5 19.9 19.3 21.4 23.3




















Broad Claims 31.3 33.0 35.6 41.3 45.9 46.4 47.2 45.8
Narrow Claims 1.0 2.4 16.8 17.5 20.5 20.3 23.0 22.7
Broad Deposit .9 2.0 17.5 17.2 20.7 21.2 22.6 22.8
Narrow Deposit .7 1.7 17.3 16.8 20.8 21.5 23.3 24.1
Source: Bank for International Settlements and Fitch IBCA.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE BANKING SECTOR 161percent. In Brazil, the broad claims measure doubled, rising from 18.0
percent to 36.1 percent. In Mexico, the broad claims measure was 31.3
percent in December 1994 and 45.8 percent in December 1999. Thus, the
broad claims measure of penetration that includes offshore lending has
grown a little less than 20 percentage points in Brazil, roughly in line with
the percentage point increases of its other penetration measures. On the
other hand, the broad claims measure in Mexico increased less than 15
percentage points, while each of the other three measures of penetration
increased by more than 20 percentage points
For all three countries, the narrow claims measure of foreign bank
penetration moves in the same way as the broad deposit measure of
foreign bank penetration. This likely reﬂects the close link between the
lending by entities located within the host country and the local avail-
ability of funding by banks. The narrow deposit measure of foreign bank
penetration tends to mirror the broad deposit measure, with a slightly
higher penetration for the broad measure in Argentina since December
1996 and in Brazil for the entire sample period, but Mexico only until
December 1997.
The narrow and broad claims measures of bank penetration seem to
be converging in Argentina, in part because of aggressive privatization of
government-owned banks. As foreign banks get established with brick
and mortar operations, an increasing share of the lending moves from
offshore to onshore. However, in Brazil and Mexico, with more resistance
to opening up banking markets, the narrow claims and both deposit
measures of penetration have remained well below those in Argentina.
While all of the measures in Brazil have tended to increase by similar
amounts, the recent increases in foreign bank subsidiaries’ claims in
Mexico have caused the gap between the degree of penetration for broad
claims and those for the other three measures to narrow, so that by
December 1999 the percentage-point gap was less than one-half of its
December 1994 value.
The penetration numbers do not indicate withdrawals of foreign
bank participation following a ﬁnancial crisis. Following the Tequila
crisis, each of the four measures of foreign bank penetration rose in
Mexico. In Argentina, only the broad claims measure declined in Decem-
ber 1995, while in Brazil, the narrow claims, broad deposit, and narrow
deposit measures showed a slight decline. Despite the turmoil created by the
East Asian crisis and the Brazilian devaluation, comparing all measures
of foreign bank penetration on December 1997 to those on December 1999
indicates an across-the-board increase in all three countries.
Total Claims and Broad Deposit Shares by Bank Category
Table 2 shows amounts of total claims and broad deposits by bank
categories for Argentina. The banks are partitioned into ﬁve categories:
162 Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengrenforeign bank subsidiaries from BIS-reporting countries, foreign bank
subsidiaries from nonreporting countries, foreign non-subsidiary claims
from reporting countries (offshore lending from BIS-reporting countries),
government-owned domestic banks, and privately owned domestic
banks.3 Foreign bank subsidiaries from BIS-reporting countries have been
consistently increasing their claims in Argentina, with much of this
increase reﬂecting the aggressive acquisition of domestic, privately
owned, and state-owned banks by European and U.S. banks. The share of
3 The government-owned bank category includes banks that are intentionally owned
by the government and does not include bridge banks that are temporarily controlled by the
government because a private bank fails. Bridge banks are assumed to retain their previous
status while the government is searching for a buyer. Generally, these would be privately
owned domestic banks that are temporarily controlled by the government until a foreign or
domestic acquirer is found.
Table 2





















BIS-Reporting 6,258 10,557 16,396 35,818 54,004 41,950 51,331 46,449
Foreign Subs
BIS-Nonreporting 122 170 2,971 4,183 4,081 3,856 3,890 3,630
Foreign Nonsubs
BIS-Reporting 30,545 28,225 31,600 37,725 22,074 38,033 32,765 40,029
Domestically Owned
State Banks 21,403 21,825 22,105 37,478 39,558 43,229 44,272 44,975
Domestically Owned




















BIS-Reporting 5,855 10,165 15,602 34,412 51,126 43,956 46,903 48,007
Foreign Subs
BIS-Nonreporting 96 115 2,232 3,371 3,272 3,192 3,218 3,057
Domestically Owned
State Banks 15,142 15,934 17,063 33,839 36,888 37,745 38,594 38,512
Domestically Owned
Private Banks 18,212 24,068 27,270 22,657 23,469 20,847 21,875 19,391
Note: Foreign ownership defined as greater than 50 percent foreign control.
Source: Bank for International Settlements and Fitch IBCA.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE BANKING SECTOR 163total claims attributable to foreign bank subsidiaries from reporting
countries grew from 7.9 percent in December 1994 to 29.6 percent in
December 1999, slightly exceeding the share attributable to state-owned
banks and more than double the share for domestically owned, privately
held commercial banks. Foreign bank subsidiaries from BIS-nonreporting
countries have also been increasing their share of total claims, from 0.2
percent in December 1994 to 2.3 percent in December 1999. Studies of
foreign bank penetration that rely on BIS data to calculate the degree of
penetration would understate it, since foreign subsidiaries from BIS-
nonreporting countries are excluded (Weller and Scher 1999). Similarly,
studies that consider only foreign bank subsidiary activity and ignore the
offshore cross-border lending that originates directly from the headquar-
ters or branches of foreign banks (which is included in the BIS data)
would substantially understate the extent of foreign bank penetration in
a country’s credit markets.
For Argentina, this offshore lending by banks headquartered in
BIS-reporting countries (foreign nonsubsidiaries reporting) accounts for a
signiﬁcant share of total claims.4 While this lending has been generally
increasing over the past ﬁve years, it has not grown as rapidly as total
claims, with its share shrinking from 38.3 percent to 25.6 percent by
December 1999. Thus, it appears that a major shift in the composition of
foreign bank lending has occurred, as foreign banks have increased their
claims through existing and newly acquired onshore bank subsidiaries in
Argentina rather than through offshore operations. Finally, the increased
share of total claims attributable to foreign banks has come at the expense
of domestically owned, private banks rather than the state-owned bank-
ing sector. While state-owned banks have increased their share of total
claims slightly, the share of domestic privately owned banks has been
halved.
The pattern during crisis periods is also interesting. During 1995,
immediately following the Tequila crisis at the end of 1994, loans at
foreign subsidiaries increased, while the share of claims from offshore
decreased, with the total foreign bank share declining just over 1
percentage point. On the domestic side, privately owned banks absorbed
an increased share, with state-owned banks shrinking their share. Simi-
larly, during the period that includes the East Asian problems and the
Brazilian devaluation, foreign bank subsidiary claims rose from 25.8
percent in December 1997 to 29.6 percent in December 1999, while the
offshore share of claims fell slightly, from 27.2 percent to 25.6 percent.
However, in this case the total share of foreign banks, including those
4 Foreign nonsubsidiary claims are calculated as total BIS claims minus claims of
foreign bank subsidiaries (deﬁned as those with at least a 50 percent foreign ownership
stake).
164 Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengrenfrom nonreporting countries, rose slightly, from 56.1 percent to 57.5
percent. The growth came at the expense of privately owned banks, with
share of state-owned banks increasing.
Similar patterns emerge in the domestic deposit market. For the
broad deposits measure shown in the bottom panel of Table 2, foreign
bank subsidiaries increased their deposit share steadily from December
1994 through June 1998. After declining somewhat, the share was again
near its June 1998 peak by December 1999. Most of this growth came at
the expense of domestic privately owned banks, which by December 1999
held a deposit share that was only about 40 percent of its 1994-95 value.
At the same time, state-owned banks also experienced a reduced share of
the domestic deposit market.
Table 3 provides the same total claims and broad deposit information
for Brazil. The share of total claims attributable to foreign bank subsid-
iaries has increased fairly steadily since 1994. The share of claims at
foreign subsidiaries from reporting countries grew from 5.1 percent in
December 1994 to 19.2 percent in December 1999. The share of claims at
foreign subsidiaries from nonreporting countries also increased, with the
share rising from 0.6 percent to 2.3 percent, although it did reach a peak
of 3.2 percent in December 1997. The offshore share of claims also grew,
although at a much slower pace than that of the foreign bank subsidiaries,
rising from 12.3 percent to 14.6 percent. Because many of the offshore
loans are denominated in U.S. dollars, the Brazilian devaluation made the
value in reais of these offshore credits increase dramatically. However, as
Figure 2 shows, BIS total claims in dollar terms have been decreasing
since the peak in June 1998.
The Tequila crisis did not have a large impact on Brazilian lending.
The share of total claims attributable to foreign bank subsidiaries de-
clined slightly between December 1994 and December 1995, for both
reporting and nonreporting countries. On the other hand, the foreign
offshore share of claims increased from 12.3 percent to 15.6 percent. On
the domestic side, privately owned banks increased their share by almost
3 percentage points, while state-owned banks lost nearly 5 percentage
points of their share. During the series of problems later in our sample
that included the East Asian crisis and the Brazilian devaluation, the
share of claims attributable to foreign bank subsidiaries continued to
increase. The share of offshore claims also rose. However, one can observe
a temporary decline in the second half of 1998 prior to the devaluation
and a decline in the second half of 1999 following the upward spike in the
share associated with the effect of the devaluation on the dollar-denom-
inated credits. During this period, the shares of both state-owned and
privately owned domestic banks declined, with the percentage-point
decline at state-owned banks roughly double that for privately owned
banks. Thus, while the Tequila crisis had little impact on foreign lending,
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE BANKING SECTOR 165it does appear that offshore lending was more sensitive to the problems
associated with the Brazilian devaluation.
Foreign bank subsidiaries from reporting countries increased their
share of broad deposits steadily throughout the period from December
1994 to December 1999, from 5.5 percent to 20.1 percent. Those from
nonreporting countries increased their share from 0.6 to 3.2 percent,
peaking in June 1998 at 3.7 percent. During this period, the share held by
state-owned banks eroded steadily, except for a temporary increase in the
second half of 1998 just prior to the devaluation, declining from 57.0
percent to only 33.6 percent. At the same time, privately owned banks
increased their share from 36.9 percent to 43.1 percent.
Table 3





















BIS-Reporting 14,764 17,294 36,884 66,208 81,441 84,079 95,837 105,508
Foreign Subs
BIS-Nonreporting 1,511 1,374 3,874 15,726 16,894 8,980 9,662 12,815
Foreign Nonsubs
BIS-Reporting 35,348 54,429 60,370 65,683 73,510 64,516 92,084 80,571
Domestically
Owned
State Banks 141,316 154,754 170,262 161,093 163,944 162,031 159,142 154,774
Domestically
Owned




















BIS-Reporting 11,722 14,137 30,097 53,109 63,686 62,288 70,021 77,574
Foreign Subs
BIS-Nonreporting 1,234 1,081 3,032 13,995 14,524 8,890 9,430 12,269
Domestically
Owned
State Banks 121,996 141,661 155,836 173,404 140,296 138,599 133,479 129,443
Domestically
Owned
Private Banks 78,989 104,925 140,770 166,562 174,024 159,267 158,524 166,393
Note: Foreign ownership defined as greater than 50 percent foreign control.
Source: Bank for International Settlements and Fitch IBCA.
166 Joe Peek and Eric S. RosengrenTable 4 shows the shares of total claims and broad deposits by
category of bank for Mexico. Unlike Argentina and Brazil, Mexico does
not have foreign subsidiaries from BIS-nonreporting countries and, since
our sample period follows the reprivatization of Mexican banks, does not
have state-owned commercial banks during our sample period. Foreign
bank subsidiaries have increased their share of total claims in Mexico
dramatically, from 0.7 percent in December 1994 to 15.9 percent in
December 1999, with most of the increase occurring during 1996. Al-
though the share of claims attributable to offshore operations of foreign
banks ﬂuctuated, its value of 29.9 percent in December 1999 is little
changed from its 30.6 percent value in December 1994. Thus, the increase
in the share attributable to foreign bank subsidiaries came at the expense
of privately owned domestic banks, as their share decreased from 68.7
percent to 54.2 percent. This decline occurred steadily over the sample
period, although the share did rise somewhat in the second half of 1999.
Finally, the rise in the share of broad deposits of foreign bank subsidiaries
is even larger than that for total claims, coming totally at the expense of
domestically owned private sector banks.
The three tables showing the changing shares of total claims and
broad deposits across categories of banks indicate several trends. First,
foreign bank subsidiaries from BIS-nonreporting countries have in-
creased their shares in Argentina and Brazil. Thus, BIS data focused only
Table 4





















BIS-Reporting 7,033 20,994 140,216 148,432 169,500 193,756 217,546 198,546
Foreign Nonsubs
BIS-Reporting 314,728 412,983 352,690 486,721 530,266 612,333 565,178 594,873
Domestically Owned




















BIS-Reporting 6,068 16,470 133,443 140,437 179,122 206,193 236,292 226,498
Domestically Owned
Private Banks 643,379 798,837 843,653 871,582 870,979 948,326 944,097 923,410
Note: Foreign ownership defined as greater than 50 percent foreign control.
Source: Bank for International Settlements and Fitch IBCA.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE BANKING SECTOR 167on foreign lending exposures from reporting countries will understate the
increase in foreign bank penetration in these two (and likely other) Latin
American countries, as these countries become more integrated. Second,
the growth in the shares attributable to foreign bank subsidiaries has
increased steadily and substantially in each of the three countries.
Furthermore, the evidence does not indicate any great reluctance on the
part of foreign bank subsidiaries to expand operations when the host
country is suffering from a crisis. Third, offshore lending appears to be
somewhat more sensitive to economic instability in the host country than
is the case for onshore operations.
CONCLUSION
Foreign entry into domestic banking markets remains a contentious
issue. Whether privatizing a state bank in Brazil or selling a failed bank
in Japan, the proposed sale of a large domestic ﬁnancial institution,
possibly to a foreign acquirer, frequently results in a major controversy.
Many Asian countries have yet to experience major foreign penetration of
domestic banking markets, while Latin American countries have privat-
ized many of their banks and have encouraged foreign banks to enter
their domestic markets. Because many Latin American countries opened
their markets during the 1990s, and because they have experienced
exchange rate and banking crises as well as severe ﬂuctuations in their
macroeconomies over this period, Latin American countries provide a
good laboratory for understanding the effects of foreign bank penetration.
An examination of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico indicates that the
growth of foreign bank subsidiaries has continued unabated, despite the
economic problems buffeting these countries. Foreign bank subsidiaries
did not pull back in response to economic problems in the host country;
rather, they viewed the economic problems as providing opportunities to
expand, either by acquisition or by internal growth of existing subsidiar-
ies. The same is not true for offshore lending. Offshore lending does
sometimes retrench during difﬁcult economic times. Thus, if a country is
concerned about the stability of foreign lending, it should encourage
cross-border lending through brick and mortar subsidiary operations
rather than through offshore lending. Furthermore, such lending has
advantages from a supervisory standpoint, since subsidiaries are likely to
behave more like domestic banks, while offshore lending is more difﬁcult
for the host country supervisor to monitor or inﬂuence.
Understanding the ﬁnancial condition and motivations of foreign
bank operations represents another important supervisory issue. In
Argentina, with more than half the banking system under foreign control,
it will become increasingly important to understand the intentions of
foreign bank management and foreign bank supervisors. While coordi-
nation of international bank supervision has improved, the movement
168 Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengrentoward greater supervisory coordination needs to accelerate. Major
changes by bank supervisors or bank management could result in a
signiﬁcant shrinkage of the ﬁnancial system in a host country and
reverberate through the local economy. In addition, diversiﬁcation in the
nationalities of foreign banks lending to a host country is advisable, so
that banking problems in any one home country do not pose signiﬁcant
hardships in the host country.
The Bank for International Settlements has improved our under-
standing of international banking ﬂows and helped coordinate bank
supervision internationally. However, more needs to be done. The focus
of BIS data on ﬂows from reporting countries will become less relevant as
banks from nonreporting countries increase their foreign presence and
countries in a given geographical region become more integrated. This is
particularly true in Latin America, where banks from nonreporting
countries have been establishing sizable foreign subsidiaries in neighbor-
ing countries.
The importance of having good banking data that are comparable
across countries will only increase. Academic studies that have used data
on foreign bank penetration should be cautious in interpreting results
and drawing conclusions. Foreign bank penetration data vary substan-
tially depending on the measure used. Studies of the depth of banking
markets and the effects of foreign bank penetration have often focused
only on foreign bank subsidiaries located in the host country, ignoring
the important role of offshore lending or, if they do focus on BIS
cross-border claims data, not supplementing those data with informa-
tion for foreign bank operations from nonreporting countries. These
factors can affect the measured magnitude of foreign bank penetration
as well as its trend, which should cause researchers to be particularly
cautious in interpreting their results. The banking data are further
complicated by the difﬁculty in obtaining reliable structural informa-
tion on domestic banking systems. The BIS and other international
organizations could play an important role in encouraging more
consistent reporting of banking data, both balance sheet and income
data and structural changes in banking markets, in order to help
improve analysis of emerging markets.
The presence of foreign bank subsidiaries potentially can provide
large beneﬁts to the host country. Foreign banks may introduce new
technology and management, accelerating ﬁnancial development. For-
eign banks are also more diversiﬁed and are less likely to be forced to
shrink because of local economic problems. In fact, we ﬁnd evidence that
foreign subsidiaries expanded during such troubled times in the host
country. Being better diversiﬁed against local banking problems should
ameliorate credit crunches and provide a more competitive banking
market for borrowers and depositors in host countries.
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